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OptimizationAbstract Due to the absence of infrastructure support, secure data dissemination is a challenging
task in scalable mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) environment. In most of the traditional routing
techniques for MANETs, either security has not been taken into account or only one aspect of secu-
rity concern has been addressed without optimizing the routing performance. This paper proposes
Flooding Factor based Framework for Trust Management (F3TM) in MANETs. True ﬂooding
approach is utilized to identify attacker nodes based on the calculation of trust value. Route
Discovery Algorithm is developed to discover an efﬁcient and secure path for data forwarding using
Experimental Grey Wolf algorithm for validating network nodes. Enhanced Multi-Swarm Opti-
mization is used to optimize the identiﬁed delivery path. Simulations are carried out in ns2 to assess
and compare the performance of F3TM with the state-of-the-art frameworks: CORMAN and
PRIME considering the metrics including delay, packet delivery ration, overhead and throughput.
The performance assessment attests the reliable security of F3TM compared to the state-of-the-art
frameworks.
 2016 The Authors. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of King Saud University. This is
an open access article under the CCBY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) have an enormous num-
ber of networks and hops, without any closed infrastructure
and protected secure data transmission. In this situation,
whenever a node communicates and shares data with other
nodes on the network, various problems will occur such asthe route path, attacker interruption (McNerney and Zhang,
2012) and data delivery problems. To avoid these problems,
it is possible to use the following approaches including the
Route Discovery Algorithm, the True ﬂooding algorithm
(TFA), the Route Request, Route Replay method, and Rout-
ing efﬁciency (Lafta and Al-Salih, 2014), along with the Net-
work Overload Method and the Enhanced Multi-Swarm
Optimization method. The results of the above stated prob-
lems show that each mobile ad hoc network can detect mali-
cious nodes, and start communicating through the secure
path using this study’s proposed system.
This work has dealt with past interaction history-based
recognition and avoidance of malicious nodes and Denial-of-
Service attacks on the network layer, namely Grayhole,
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et al., 2006) attacks through the use of this study’s proposed
scheme, speciﬁcally a minimized secure True ﬂooding trust
value scheme (MSTFTV) (Vadivel and Narasimhan, 2014).
This scheme always provides a ﬂooding factor, and indicates
the presence of the attacker node and its attack.
In this regard, both the sender-based MSTFTV scheme and
the receiver-based MSTFTV scheme are also used to discover
the ﬂooding factor. Flooding factor results show that the pro-
posed scheme detects malicious nodes and improves routing
paths (Assis and Giozza, 2010). A list of ad hoc protocols is
needed to control how nodes decide the way to route packets,
with respect to the source node and destination nodes. All
those types of protocols are classiﬁed based on a number of
constrains, including expensive infrastructure, the distribution
of information, network functions, central entities, Route
Request, and number of nodes. All those constraints are peri-
odically used in any type of ﬂooding attack on the Reactive
Routing.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
reviews related works on secure data transmission frameworks.
Section 3 presents Key Assignment Algorithm, then the pro-
posed optimization algorithm is given in Section 4. True ﬂood-
ing algorithm, itinerant algorithm, and past interaction history
are presented in Sections 5,6, and 8 respectively. The result and
performance analysis is explained in Section 4. Then the work
is concluded in Section 92. Related works
Chang et al. (2008) have proposed a model to analyze the trust
value for a sender sending packets to several receivers, through
a multicast session. Since members of a multicast group change
frequently, the issue of supporting secure authentication and
authorization in multicast MANET becomes more critical
than the network providing a ﬁxed central authentication
(CA) server. To overcome this effort, this study introduces
the Head_CV consideration, and this Head_CV gives the CA
authority to individual nodes for the ignored time period.
Within this time period, the normal node will determine
whether the neighbor node is malicious or not (Chang et al.,
2008).
Al Mazrouei and Narayanaswami (2011) have proposed a
mechanism to detect and remove Blackhole and Grayhole
attacks (Al Mazrouei and Narayanaswami, 2011). Their pro-
posed solution tackles these attacks by maintaining an
Extended Data Routing Information (EDRI) Table at each
node, in addition to the Routing Table of the AODV routing
protocol. To overcome this effort, this study introduces the
past interaction history-based pattern for storing new transac-
tions for every node over the network.
Wang et al. has proposed the Cooperative Opportunistic
Routing in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (CORMAN) (Wang
et al., 2012). It was a remedy for accepting as a challenge
behind the opportunistic data transfer of mobile ad hoc net-
works. The solution is to test CORMAN and to compare it
to AODV, and to observe signiﬁcant performance improve-
ment in varying mobile settings. CORMAN uses the
Nakagami fading model in ns-2, and compares it to the well-
understood AODV in an array of mobile network scenarios.
The performance improvement of CORMAN they observedis substantial. Contributions through their solution are high-
lighted as a means of ﬁnding the path selection aspect through
a correct manner. Consequently they use the lightweight
proactive source routing protocol, so that each node has com-
plete knowledge of how to route data to all other nodes in the
network, at any time.
McNerney and Zhang (2012) demonstrated through the use
of a simulation study that the single-path adaptation approach
to MANET QoS provisioning (McNerney and Zhang, 2012;
Long et al., 2013) is no longer sufﬁcient in adversarial environ-
ments. It identiﬁes the conditions in which an additional mea-
sure, for instance an adaptive multi-path routing extension,
may be necessary for maintaining service quality. The study
uses the INSIGNIA signaling system as a facilitator of the
single-path adaptation approach, and evaluates its effective-
ness in the presence of Blackhole and Grayhole data forward-
ing attacks and a denial of a QoS request attack on QoS
signaling (McNerney and Zhang, 2012; Rmayti et al., 2014a).
Results are evaluated through the use of a service quality met-
ric deﬁned in this paper. To overcome this effort, this study
introduces the Itinerant algorithm, and also it ﬁnds that the
efﬁcient sender-based Minimized secures the True ﬂooding
trust value scheme, and that the Receiver-based Minimized
secures the True ﬂooding trust value scheme.
Rmayti et al. (2014b) have proposed a novel approach to
watchdog, based on two Bayesian ﬁlters, particularly those
of Bernoulli and Multinomial (Rmayti et al., 2014b). This
study uses these two models in a complementary manner, in
order to successfully detect the packet dropping attacks in
mobile ad hoc networks. Based on the simulation results, the
study’s proposed ﬁlters have proven that these attacks can be
detected with a high rate of accuracy. To overcome this effort,
the Enhanced Multi-Swam Optimization Algorithm has been
introduced as a means to prevent the mobility node Location,
pattern route path, time taken for send data packet, and the
Time taken for receive data packet. This study overcame these
issues through the ID assignment to the node, namely the
Node IdDS.
The routing method of Perkins et al. (2006) allows for a col-
lection of nodes exchange data through various paths, with
respect to the multi-hop path of interconnection (Perkins
and Bhagwat, 1994). Within networks, each station of nodes
store their Routing Tables, which are useful for transmitting
packets between the stations, due to the performing path
between those stations. Such a Routing Table contains all
the numbers of hops, and also the available destinations. Each
route table entry is tagged with a sequence number, which
originates at the destination station. Each station periodically
transmits updates, and then transmits those updates immedi-
ately when signiﬁcant new information is available. Also it
makes no assumptions about the phase relationship of the
update periods between the mobile hosts. These packets indi-
cate which stations are accessible from each station, and the
number of hops necessary to reach these accessible stations,
as is often achieved through distance-vector routing algo-
rithms. The DSDV protocol requires each mobile station to
advertise its own Routing Table to each of its current neigh-
bors. In this way, a mobile computer may exchange data with
any other mobile computer in the group, even if the target of
the data is not within the range of direct communication.
Garcia-Luna-Aceves et al. proposed the PRIME frame-
work based on interest-deﬁned mesh enclaves, which is the
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(Garcia-Luna-Aceves and Menchaca-Mendez, 2011). When
compared with the traditional unicast and multicast routing
schemes for MANETs, like AODV, OLSR and ODMRP,
the beneﬁt of PRIME is that it gains with the effort of similar
or better data delivery and end-to-end delays. In addition to
that approach, this is used for routing, and the distinction
between on-demand and proactive signaling for routing is
eliminated. Interest-driven signaling is used instead. A com-
parison of the performance of PRIME with some relevant
multicast and unicast routing protocols for MANETs is
described based on the routing protocols, supporting unicast
trafﬁc, multicast trafﬁc, and a combination of both. The main
focus of PRIME is minimum-hop routing, which compares
PRIME to ODMRP and PUMA, in order to determine the
effectiveness of PRIME as a multicast routing protocol. In
the case of unicast trafﬁc, they compare PRIME against OLSR
and AODV, and vary the number of concurrent unicast ﬂows
and node density.
The scheme proposed by Vadivel and Narasimhan (2014)
has two algorithms, namely the sender-phase algorithm and
the receiver-phase algorithm. The sender-phase algorithm of
the proposed work aids a node in selecting a subset of neigh-
bors to forward the ﬂooding message (Vadivel and
Narasimhan, 2014). The sender-phase algorithm selects for-
warding nodes with the highest contribution to ﬂooding mes-
sage dissemination. To overcome this effort, this study
introduces a new TFA to ﬁnd a MSTFTV scheme based on
the ﬂooding factor. Here the Node has an ID-based digital sig-
nature key, so it is very challenging to calculate some perfor-
mance metrics like trust value (Wei et al., 2014), and time to
delay and attacks, but it is possible to overcome all these
issues.
Fig. 1 shows the overall Architecture of F3TM, which con-
sists of ﬁve process phases including the IdDS-Key Assignment
Algorithm, the TFA for ﬁnding trust value can be brieﬂy
declared, and from this the attacker can be found, the Route
Discovery Algorithm can discover the efﬁcient secure path,
the Route Request Route Replay method can be used for
the packet delivery ratio, the New Experimental Grey Wolf
algorithm can be used to validate nodes, and the Enhanced
Multi-Swarm Optimization method can be used for optimizing
the attacker node.
3. Key Assignment Algorithm (KAA)
The Key Assignment Algorithm is an Identiﬁcation-based
Digital signature, encouraged by the Head_CA to send
ID-based Digital signature keys to many mobile nodes, in
order to secure the nodes within the boundary level for
awareness of malicious node attacks. The individual key
has been randomly driven through from the neighbor node
(Jain and Raisinghani, 2014) to the destination node, in
the form of a packet. The key generation algorithm evolves
an existing key management scheme to a new secure node
Key management scheme.
Fig. 2 shows the key assignment process of the node initial-
ization presence of the digital signature. The following descrip-
tion gives the initialization of nodes, with bandwidth and
latency calculated through using the Digital signature.3.1. IdDS-Key Assignment Algorithm (KAA)
The IdDS-Key Assignment Algorithm describes, ﬁnds and
assigns keys to individual nodes within the network, and
describes node properties that correspond to bandwidth, node
life time, and node latency. It also provides a security mecha-
nism (Al Mazrouei and Narayanaswami, 2011; Lacharite´ et al.,
2008) to the individual nodes, instead of giving a digital signa-
ture to individual nodes through cluster agents in the network
groups. It gives a secure key assignment to each and every
node based IdDS-Key Assignment Algorithm. KAA is
described through the algorithm proposed below.
Let N be the total No. of Node, MN (MANET Network),
which consists of:
MN ¼ N1;N2;N3;N4; ::;Nlgf 8N eMN ð1Þ
We can calculate a, b, and d for individual nodes from the
bandwidth of hop, node lifetime (TTL) and node latency,
where x is assigned to the individual mobile node, a to the
node bandwidth, b to the node life time, and d to the node
latency.
Find the bandwidth of the individual node with the cluster
agent through the following formulae.
First and foremost, Node latency is calculated through the
following three ﬁelds,
LatencyðdÞ ¼ hsnd initial signal pktsjrcvd valid signal pkts
jtime consumei
BandwidthðaÞ ¼ Network sizeðNÞ ¼
Pl
n¼1ðxÞ
LatencyðdÞ ð2Þ
To discover the valid node V of the individual nodes in
group (MN):
V ¼
Xl
N¼1
MNlog2
ðBandwidthjlife timeÞ
Latency
ð3Þ
V is equal to the total number of nodes available in the partic-
ular group.
After validating all nodes in the particular group (MN), the
digital signature key is sent through the HCA node and thus,
the node has a secure key with a Key Assignment Algorithm
(KAA):
MN ¼ fN1k1 ;N2k2 ;N3k3 ;N4k4 ; . . . ;Nlkmg ð4Þ
The digital signature key is assigned through the following
description:
x is the digital signature key assignment:
x ¼ fðVjN1k1Þ; ðVjN2k2 Þ; ðVjN3k3Þ; ðVjN4k4Þ; . . . ; ðVjNlkmÞg
8V;NeMN ð5Þ
After assigning the secure key to the individual node, each
node has the ability to connect the HCA node (Head Cluster
Agent) and clustering groups, based on the related digital sig-
nature key, and also maintains the signal strength of each node
with the help of hop mobility, and high secure acquisition
prominence.
Prominently the entire Key Assignment Algorithm (KAA)
gives Node Shaping Optimization, Security Performance (Al
Mazrouei and Narayanaswami, 2011; Lacharite´ et al., 2008),
Improved Latency, and/or also usable bandwidth for some
Figure 1 F3TM architecture.
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Figure 2 IdDS-Key Assignment Algorithm.
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shaping effects.
3.2. Algorithm for the Key Assignment
For assigning keys to the individual nodes in the network, we
can follow the below description for allocating secure keys
with identiﬁcation-based digital signatures.
The Key Assignment Algorithm is used for allocating the
key, by calculating the bandwidth and latency of the node. It
will direct to ﬁnding the node bandwidth and assigning a dig-
ital signature. Bandwidth is useful for ﬁnding the trust valuecalculation and digital signature, bringing it into being the
node security at the entire transmission. To ﬁnd the shortest
path based on the node count, ﬁrst we derive the best routing
path, with consideration of both the trust values and the num-
ber of network node counts. It may be the start node of the
destination node with respect to the gate way. The hop count
is likened to the number of iterations to the network nodes.
This may be constructed based on the TFA. We use Route
Discovery Algorithms to calculate the best routing path, and
we need to convert the Flooding Factor to the trust value.
The trust value calculation is based on the following equation,
which gives the trust value to the individual node, and is stored
back to past interaction history:
Trust valueðStart NodeÞ ¼ Flooding FactorðStart NodeÞ
Trust valueðDest NodeÞ ¼ Flooding FactorðDest NodeÞ
The sum of the trust values in the path is:
Trust valuesðStartNodejDestNodeÞ
¼
XMN1
x¼1
XMN1
y¼1
fx FFðSNÞg þ fy FFðDNÞg ð6Þ
where MN is the MANET network nodes which consists of the
group of the Start node (SN) and the Destination node (DN),
x is the total number of the network size with respect to the
source region of MN, and y is the total number of the network
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values of each node can be stored in the trust values table,
which provides additional security protection to open environ-
ments with a combination of software and hardware. Since the
trust values in each node are the key facilities for detecting
malicious nodes, they provide effective protection to secure
routing and avoid malicious attacks by enemies in combat
zones.
4. Proposed optimization algorithm
4.1. New Experimental Grey Wolf and Swam Optimizer-
(NEGSO)
The new experimental was the work stated by Grey Wolf Opti-
mizer (GWO). The GWO algorithm simulates the leadership
hierarchy (Clustering Head), and the chasing mechanism
(Node Finding Mechanism) of grey (old) wolves (womanizers)
in nature. Based on the New Experimental Grey Wolf and
Swam Optimizer-(NEGSO) procedure, we ﬁnd nodes with
key values and also checking the node details like node id,
node bandwidth, and node life time through the use of the
NEGSO’s Key Assignment Algorithm. Four types of old
womanizers, including alpha (a), beta (b), delta (d) and omega
(x), are active in simulating the leadership hierarchy. In addi-
tion, four main steps are required to ﬁnd an attacker node
within the group of nodes:
1. Chasing the nodes.
2. Searching for target nodes.
3. Inclosing the target nodes.
4. Attacking the target nodes.
These steps are very much useful in searching an individual
node, and also in ﬁnding an attacker node with the help of
trust value (Chang et al., 2008; Yang et al., 2014) calculation.
Here we have to use the ﬂooding factor (Vadivel and
Narasimhan, 2014) to ﬁnd trust value (Chang et al., 2008)
implemented between nodes, as the minimum ﬂooding factor
for which each node is ﬂooded. This ﬂooding factor permits
the sender-based MSTFTV scheme and the receiver-based
MSTFTV scheme, using the MSTFTV scheme. As it gives,
all trust values (Chang et al., 2008) were calculated and com-
pared to the past interaction history (PIH). Here the PIH is
a collection of all previous tasks and checks the previous ﬂood-
ing history (Vadivel and Narasimhan, 2014), through which
the highest ﬂooding factor rapidly ﬁnds a secure path between
them.
4.2. Enhanced Multi-Swam Optimization Algorithm (EM-
SOA)
The Enhanced Multi-Swam Optimization Algorithm reduces
the gatherings of malicious nodes, by using the optimization
attacker node within the network.
1. Chasing the nodes
Individual nodes need to be found, and keys need to be
assigned to each node, using the IdDS-Key Assignment Algo-
rithms with digital signatures.2. Searching for target nodes
Search and ﬁnd the node with properties similar to the CA.
This also proves the GWO algorithm. If we originate the node
within the CA boundary, the presence of the key allocation
algorithm and all digital signatures given to the individual
nodes, the target node will be found based on the route (path)
selection. With the help of the path ﬁnding algorithm, the
node’s key, the lifetime (time to live) and the bandwidth of
the node, we can calculate the target individual node. After
ﬁnding this target node, the data will be shared between the
trusted nodes.
3. Surrounding target nodes
With the help of the trusted target nodes (Qureshi et al.,
2010) the nearby nodes are observed through the following
ways. Firstly, based on the decreased trust value, we have to
give a CA authority to each and every node in the network.
Each node has a CA authority to determine if the nearest node
is an attacker or not. Then all CA nodes send their own
ROUTE REQUEST key packets to the nearest neighbor node,
and obtain ROUTE REPLAY key packets from valid users.
The ROUTE REPLAY key packets are checked and com-
pared with past interaction histories. Checking and comparing
results show that the node is ready to communicate with the
Head CA node for secure data sharing. In this manner, the
Route ﬁnding algorithm Enhanced has simulated annealing
and the Enhanced TABU search (Dahiya and Johari, 2014)
is present when ﬁnding neighboring (Jain and Raisinghani,
2014) target nodes.
EM-SOA is an algorithm which reduces the gatherings of
malicious nodes, using the optimization attacker node within
the network. It is wide-ranging, and there is no structure for
the network to detect difﬁcult nodes, which involves data shar-
ing within the network.
Because each and every node travels from place to place,
these nodes are called itinerant nodes. This time the node prop-
erties change according to the following criteria: location, pat-
tern route path, time to the send packet, and time to the
received packet.
The itinerant algorithm is a compromise of four related
issues. When it occurs on the mobility of nodes, we use the fol-
lowing steps with regard to the itinerant algorithm:
1. ID assignment to the node.
2. Node IdDS-Key Assignment Algorithm.
Fig. 3 shows the Enhanced Multi-Swam Optimization,
which is used to optimize the attacker node. Here the Route
Discovery Algorithms are used to discover the efﬁcient secure
path of nodes; and CA authentication used for ﬁnding the
actual neighbor node, as well as maintaining the Head
CA_Node. The Head CA_Node is used for control over the
nearby neighbor node (Jain and Raisinghani, 2014). Finally,
the node validation must be performed through the New
Excremental Grey Wolf algorithm.5. True flooding algorithm
The True ﬂooding algorithm allows nodes to have an indepen-
dent digital signature key form Head_CA and delivers the
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Figure 3 Diagram of the Enhanced Multi-Swam Optimization
Algorithm.
274 M.N. Ahmed et al.highest probability that a node and link (route) fails, due to the
behavior of the attacker node and normal node. It initially
starts with the node that does not have any key assignment
from the HEAD_CA node. In this case, the start node or ini-
tial node is identiﬁed based on the HEAD_CA packet token
delivery to the neighbor node (Jain and Raisinghani, 2014).
The valid node is consumed as a communicating node, without
any interruption for the packet sent over the network.
After ﬁnding the initial node, the key will be assigned using
the IdDS-Key Assignment Algorithm, and the node which has
the IdDS key is named the secure node of the network. The
ﬂooding factor is calculated through the use of the TFA, as
derived below. From that we require the key allotted Start
node, the Destination node, the Neighbor node, and the trust
value to the individual node, in order to ﬁnd the Flooding Fac-
tor. From the Flooding Factor, ﬁnally we ﬁnd the minimum
route of nodes. This also gives the MSTFTV scheme for ﬁnd-
ing the trust value for ﬁnding attacks (Yang et al., 2014). Here
we ﬁnd and detect the individual node properties, regardless of
whether the node is malicious or not.
Fig. 4 describes the TFA used for calculating the trust value
for the purpose of ﬁnding attackers. Here the MSTFTV
scheme is used on both the sender and receiver sides. The trust
value (Chang et al., 2008) calculation will be appropriate evenTrue Flooding Algorithm 
(Trust Value Calculation) 
The minimized secure True flooding trust 
value scheme
Sender-based MSTFTVS
Receiver-based MSTFTVS
Grayhole attack
Blackhole attack
Wormhole attack
Figure 4 Diagram of the True ﬂooding algorithm.in the case of Grayhole, Blackhole (Bindra et al., 2012), and
Wormhole attacks (Gorlatova et al., 2006). Finally, node
attackers must be discovered through the use of the TFA.
Generally, the TFA has four main criteria which can be
used to ﬁnd the three different attacks, including the Blackhole
attack, the Wormhole attack, and the Grayhole attack. The
TFA is very much useful for the invention of the Blackhole
attack for the following descriptions, including node selection,
ﬁnding the packet loss, ﬁnding the trace route, and ﬁnding the
attacker route path, all of which are helpful to trafﬁc occur-
rence due to an attacker. All those attackers are reﬁned by
the TFA, to accomplish the Blackhole attacks. Similarly, the
TFA ﬁnds the Wormhole attack, and the Grayhole attack by
the attacker route path is derived from the trafﬁc occurrence
on the route. If the trafﬁc is positive, the malicious node occur-
rence is also positive. This type of attack is called a Wormhole
attack, which is reduced through the following consumption.
Firstly, tunneling allows a network user to access or provide
a network service that the underlying network does not sup-
port or directly provide. The tunneling protocol is used to
allow a foreign protocol to run over a network that does not
support that particular protocol. In addition to that, the tun-
neling protocol works using the data portion of a packet to
carry the packets that actually provide the service. Secondly,
the Packet Location disclosure (Manikandan et al., 2011)
attack is a part of the information disclosure attack. The mali-
cious node leaks information regarding the location or struc-
ture of the network, and uses the information to implement
further attacks. It gathers the node location information, such
as a route map, and knows which nodes are situated on the tar-
get route. Trafﬁc analysis is one of the unsolved security
attacks used against MANETs. Thirdly, the patterns, speciﬁ-
cally the trafﬁc pattern and the actual pattern, are recognized
by the path route algorithm used for pattern loss. In terms of
the Wormhole attack, the derivation of the Grayhole attacks is
used ﬁrstly for reducing packet delay, secondly for gaining
energy consumption, and thirdly for enhancing the packet
delivery ratio. As a ﬁnal point, these processes are used to cal-
culate packet delivery ratio and to reduce packet loss.6. Itinerant algorithm
Based on node properties, if we want to obtain the correct
position of the normal node, we must obtain at least the id
assignment of the node independent measurements of the loca-
tion, the pattern route path, the time to send the packet, and
the time to receive the packet. All are needed for the location
or position of the valid node, which is going to be communi-
cated with each other’s node, in the presence of the Head
CA (Cluster Agent). After ﬁnding the itinerant associated
node, it is possible to obtain zero values to each other’s.
Finally, the node is ready for the communication of data
sharing.
Now we use the Enhanced Multi-swam optimization algo-
rithm for deriving the node optimization. The EM-SOA con-
sists of the following steps undertaken to ﬁnd the valid
optimized route between nodes.
6.1. Route Discovery Algorithms
Consists of nodes with
Flooding Factor based Trust Management Framework 275 node id,
 digital signature key, and
 derived itinerant less node.
Through this, the route of the shortest path can be found,
based on ﬁnding which contains
Step 1.1: Head CA.
Step 1.2: Giving CA authority to the normal node.
Step 1.3: Determining if the neighbor node is attacker or
not.
 Head_CA
A node which has the highest priority of trust value from
the MSTFTV scheme, and that particular node acts like the
head (CA) node.
 CA authority to the normal node
A node which has the selected priority of the trust value
from the MSTFTV scheme (Vadivel and Narasimhan, 2014),
that temporarily acts as the CA node with an ignored time per-
iod. Within this time period, the temporary node will send
packets nearby for the node to check the exactness or validity
of the node without any intruder available in the mobile net-
work, and ﬁnally within this selectable time period the nearby
unwanted nodes are detected. The result of the CA authority is
the normal node Route Establishment Framework, which is
observed and stored in the past interaction history (PIH).
6.2. Find the neighbor node
The Route Request is sent over the network to the entire indi-
vidual node, to ﬁnd a nearby node which has zero attackers
and thus, sent back Route Reply. Also there is a need to estab-
lish a sender-based request, as well as a receiver-based reply,
without the detection of any break to the valid node, until
the optimized well-known route is found.
Once the path has been detected, the temporary CA node,
which has ignored the time period to live, will become the nor-
mal node. This means that within the ignored time period the
trustworthy full route path will be found. Simultaneously,
interaction histories have been recorded using a past interac-
tion history.
7. Past interaction history
The past transaction history contains a node identiﬁcation
number, a gateway to the interface node, and the metric value
for the current communication. If the packet sends over the
network from two different nodes, the history of source rout-
ing, Hop-by-hop routing, and the routing metric are stored in
the Past Transaction History. If any routing path (Lafta and
Al-Salih, 2014; Dahiya and Johari, 2014) exists while the
packet is sending over nodes, the packet was not sent through
that route due to two reasons, ﬁrstly because the route is
already patterned, and secondly because the route has some
malicious attacker. This also allows for the Delay of Intruder,
Control Overhead, Packet Delivery Ratio, Energy Consump-
tion, Queue delay and Agent Trace of the overall networks.The analyzed values are modeled based on the following
formulae, which are used to ﬁnd the correct route path of
any nodes. In addition to this, the attackers are making ﬁnd-
ings based on the trust values.
Number of iterations on the same path
¼ Number of nodes presented in the MN
 cost metrics ð7Þ
Number of routes on the gateway
¼ Number of gateway between the two nodes
Current number of nodes to gateway interfaces
ð8Þ
Eqs. (7) and (8) offer a general past interaction history,
directed to ﬁnd the number of nodes which are presented in
the form of an attacker. The analyzed values of the past inter-
action history, as constructed in Table 3, is useful for ﬁnding
and combining the number of iterations and number of routes
in the concerned network nodes. This is used to store the pre-
vious history of the processing scheme of F3TM.8. Performance analysis
Within the experimental analysis, the performance of network
nodes is analyzed using the proposed Flooding Factor based
Trust Management Framework (Guo et al., 2011).
The proposed methodology is implemented through the use
of NS-2. This is a popular and well-known network simulator
tool. This tool is used in the areas of MANET, wireless sensor
network and others. In this work, the network consists of 100
mobile nodes and attacker nodes. The simulation model of the
network is presented in Fig. 5.
8.1. Simulation parameters
Simulation parameters are used while implementing the pro-
posed technique, which is summarized below in Table 1. These
parameters are used to construct the network. The AODV pro-
tocol (Bindra et al., 2012; Gorlatova et al., 2006) is taken as an
existing work, and is compared and applied to various tech-
niques such as PRIME and CORMAN, as well as this study’s
proposed system F3TM. The graphs are obtained through the
above comparison techniques.
Simulation parameters consist of network simulator envi-
ronmental attributes, which are used to establish the NS-2
implementation process. Simulation parameters describe rates
and values of parameters, which are used in the F3TM Frame-
work. Table 1 includes Channel, Mac Layer, Max Packet,
Mobility Model, Number of Attackers, Number of Nodes,
Propagation, Propagation Model, Queue, Radio Range, Rout-
ing Protocol, Simulation Time, Trafﬁc Source, the X dimen-
sion of the topography, and the Y dimension of the
topography.
The initialization and past interaction history factors are
tabulated based on the above simulation, and the past interac-
tion history of the concern. Here the iteration on the same path
calculation is based on Eq. (7), and the route on the gateway is
based on Eq. (8).
Table 2 consists of a network node explanation with regard
to the network ID, next hop, current gateway node, cost,
Figure 5 Simulation model of the network.
Table 1 Simulation parameters.
Simulation parameter Value
Antenna Omni antenna
Channel Wireless channel
Mac layer 802.11
Max packet 100
Mobility model Random way point
Number of attackers 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30
Number of nodes 50, 100, 150, 200
Propagation Two ray ground
Propagation model Two ray ground
Queue Droptail/PriQueue
Radio range 250 M
Routing protocol F3TM
Simulation time 200 s
Traﬃc source CBR (constant bit rate)
The X dimension of the topography 1000
The Y dimension of the topography 1000
276 M.N. Ahmed et al.number of iterations and number of routes on the gateway,
used for the past interaction history of the particular node.
Table 3 consists of the network node analysis of the inter-
action history values of nodes, in terms of network ID, next
hop, current gateway node, cost, the number of iterations
and the number of routes on the gateway, the values of which
are tabulated by the system generated simulation parameters inTable 2 General past interaction history.
Network ID Next hop Current node to
gateway
Co
Network
destination
Net mask Gateway Interface M
0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 192.168.0.1 192.168.0.100 10
127.0.0.0 255.0.0.0 127.0.0.1 127.0.0.1 1
192.168.0.0 255.255.255.0 192.168.0.100 127.0.0.1 10
192.168.0.100 255.255.255.255 127.0.0.1 127.0.0.1 10
192.168.0.1 255.255.255.255 192.168.0.100 192.168.0.100 10Table 1. The node patterns were described based on the outer
boundary values, which have been classiﬁed and named as
trusted and untrusted parameters.
Trusted patterns enable the region boundary mobile nodes
and untrusted patterns described, as based on the outer bound-
ary region, both of which are listed based on the node location
on MANET. The trust values for both the sender and receiver
have been calculated through the use of Eq. (6). Likewise, the
lifetime of the node, and its bandwidth and efﬁciency were
illustrated in the experimental simulation, through the use of
the network simulation tool-2. Finally, the past interaction his-
tory of the process is useful for verifying and reusing the past
network process.
8.2. Evaluation metrics
The performance metrics of this work have been measured
through the following criteria, including packet delivery ratio,
overhead, delay and throughput. All those parameters show
efﬁcient results toward the F3TM framework, when compared
with the AODV and DSDV. These results are discussed below
in Table 4, and all evaluation criteria are measured based on
the attacker presence in the network, as well as the number
of nodes delivered to the destination with respect to the TFA.
Table 4 consists of the consolidated parameters of the node,
including the number of hops, the sequence number of the con-
cerned node, the time taken for the installation, and the timest No. of nodes
presented
No. of iterations of
same path
No. of routes on the
gateway
etric
126 1260 2
16,382 16,382 7
100 1000 1
27,889 278,890 11
27,734 277,340 11
Table 3 Past interaction history analysis values.
Network ID Node pattern Trust value Lifetime (Ms) Eﬃciency Bandwidth
Network destination Net mask Sender node Receiver node
0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 Untrusted 4 96 0.3 96 High
127.0.0.0 255.0.0.0 Trusted 2 98 0.2 93 Low
192.168.0.0 255.255.255.0 Trusted 20 90 0.01 94 Low
192.168.0.100 255.255.255.255 Untrusted 10 90 0.11 94 High
Flooding Factor based Trust Management Framework 277interval received packet count. All the above parameters are
used to calculate the delay, control overhead, packet delivery
ratio and throughput.
8.2.1. Average delay
Average delay is calculated by taking the delays for every data
packet transmitted to the total number of received packets, as
deﬁned below in Eq. (9). With respect to the received control
packets, the sent data packet is measured with the node prop-
erties. Based on the delay parameter of the individual node
capabilities, the packet delay was measured and tabulated in
Table 5.
Average Delay ¼ Sum of All Packets Delay
Total No of Received Packets
ð9Þ
Table 5 consists of the private IP address-based node,
which has been sent through the network path. Each path
has some transmission medium, such as a gateway IP address.
This is used to direct the packet direction and the node prop-
erties, and it is signiﬁcant for measuring the packet delay
between the nodes.
Similarly, all other packet transmission delays are calcu-
lated based on Eq. (9), and there is a comparison of both the
PRIME and CORMAN techniques, with the proposed
F3TM, with respect to the AODV protocol. The average delay
for selecting the paths is graphed below.
Fig. 6 shows the graph of the average delay taken for
F3TM and PRIME and CORMAN with AODV. Both the
PRIME and CORMAN have high average delays, comparable
with F3TM and AODV.
8.2.2. Overhead
The packet overhead refers to the time taken to transmit data
on a network. Each packet requires extra bytes of data, and a
control packet added to the transmitted data, in order to carry
out the routing information and the error correcting and oper-
ational instructions of the particular data. The energy con-
sumption or packet lost during delivery from the source to
the destination, which will reduce the overall transmission
speed of the raw data, deﬁnes the ratio of the total number
of control packets generated to the total number of data pack-
ets received, during the simulation time.
Overhead ¼ Data packets received
Control packets generated
ð10Þ
Generally, the received data packets and the received con-
trol packets are helpful for ﬁnding the overhead, with respect
to the attacker node presence. Here three frameworks are com-
pared, namely PRIME, CORMAN and F3TM, with the pres-
ence of attackers in the network with AODV (see Table 6).Fig. 7 shows the overhead graph for CORMAN and
PRIME Overhead and F3TM. It shows that PRIME and
CORMAN have high Overhead values, whereas the proposed
F3TM with AODV takes lesser values (see Table 7).
8.2.3. Packet delivery ratio (PDR)
The packet delivery ratio is the ratio between the numbers of
packets successfully received at the destinations, and the total
number of packets sent by sources deﬁned in Eq. (11). The
number of data packets delivered to the destination illustrates
the level of data delivered to the destination. Mathematically,
the information can be deﬁned as follows:
Packet delivery ratio ¼ Received packets
Sent packets
 100 ð11Þ
The following Fig. 8 shows the fractions of data packets,
which are successfully delivered during the simulation time,
versus the number of nodes in the presence of an attacker’s
interruption of the transmission nodes. Performance of the
F3TM reduces regularly, while the packet delivery ratio
increases in the case of F3TM and AODV. Finally, experimen-
tal results have shown that F3TM is better among the AODV
protocols CORMAN and PRIME, with even the AODV pro-
tocol having the attacker in the MANET.
Fig. 8 shows the graph of PDR for CORMAN, and the
PRIME frameworks which take the low PDR, and the pro-
posed F3TM which takes the higher packet delivery ratio.
8.2.4. Throughput
On a technical level, throughput is described as the total num-
ber of packets successfully delivered per unit of time. The time
window is the period during which the throughput is mea-
sured. The throughput is deﬁned as the number of tasks com-
pleted in a given time period.
Throughput ¼ Total number of packets delivered successfully
Total time internal
ð12Þ
Table 8 presents the packet’s delivery to the destination,
and the calculation of the consolidated time interval for each
node, which is useful for minimizing the throughput of the
individual node transmission. This will become higher within
the range of the particular node of the attacker presence. This
has been illustrated in the following Fig. 9.
F3TM was evaluated for a period of time, with the pro-
posed algorithms helping to offer the best performance.
Fig. 9 gives a throughput comparison of the existing tech-
niques of CORMAN and PRIME frameworks, with the pro-
posed F3TM within the AODV framework. From this, it is
Table 4 Consolidated parameters of performance analysis.
Next hop
(neighbor
node)
Number
of hops
Sequence
number
Installation
time (Ms)
Time
interval
(Ms)
Packets received Over
head
Average
delay
Sent
packets
Packet
loss
PDR Time
interval
Data
packet
Control
packet
192.168.0.1 0 A46 001000 0.001 300 100 3 0.05 8500 500 94.25 0.7661
127.0.0.1 1 B36 001200 0.002 400 100 4 1 450 50 91.00 0.8611
192.168.0.100 2 C28 001500 0.005 600 100 6 7 350 50 87.75 1.0952
127.0.0.1 3 D11 001700 0.008 800 100 8 4 250 25 85.75 1.1111
192.169.0.100 4 E9 001600 0.007 1000 100 10 7.5 175 30 83.04 1.2055
192.169.0.100 5 F2 001900 0.005 1100 100 13 10 150 20 81.00 1.2600
Table 5 Calculation of the average delay.
Total number of packets Received packets Packet delay (with respect to the attackers)
Received control packets Received data packets PRIME with AODV CORMAN with AODV F3TM with AODV
100 300 8000 4 6 0
100 400 500 6 8 1
100 600 300 8 12 7
100 800 225 14 17 4
100 1000 145 20 22 8
100 1100 130 22 23 10
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Figure 6 Comparison graph of the average delay of F3TM with
AODV, and CORMAN and PRIME with AODV.
Table 6 Calculation of control overhead.
The total number of
packets
Overhead
Received
control
packets
Received
data
packets
PRIME
with
AODV
CORMAN
with AODV
F3TM
with
AODV
100 300 5 9 3
100 400 7 11 4
100 600 9 14 6
100 800 12 16 8
100 1000 14 18 10
100 1100 16 20 13
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Figure 7 Comparison graph of the overhead of F3TM with
AODV, and CORMAN and PRIME with AODV.
278 M.N. Ahmed et al.clearly shown that the proposed technique achieves a better
throughput than the existing technique.
Finally, the resultant quality of factors, like delay, packet
delivery ratio, throughput, and overhear for various frame-
works like PRIME and CORMAN, were compared with the
F3TM framework. The PRIME framework is based on
interest-deﬁned mesh enclaves, with efforts that archive similar
or better data delivery and end-to-end delays, and that
approach is used for routing. The CORMAN framework is
Cooperative Opportunistic Routing in mobile ad hoc net-
works, used for the path selection aspect using the lightweight
proactive source routing protocol. In addition to that, all the
frameworks are applied to the AODV routing protocol, and
offer a comparison to those in the path selection. The one that
will achieve the F3TM is a better Framework, when compared
to all others. Those results prove that the Flooding Factor
Table 7 Calculation for packet delivery ratio.
Number
of
packets
received
Number
of
packets
sent over
the
network
Packets
lost
Packet delivery ratio
PRIME
with
AODV
CORMAN
with
AODV
F3TM
with
AODV
8000 8500 500 92 89 94
500 450 50 89 86 91
300 350 50 86 82 88
225 250 25 83 88 86
145 175 30 80 78 83
130 150 20 78 75 81
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Figure 8 Comparison graph of the PDR of F3TM with AODV,
and CORMAN and PRIME with AODV.
Table 8 Calculation of throughput.
Total
number Of
packets
received
Consolidated
time interval for
each node (Ms)
Throughput
PRIME
with
AODV
CORMAN
with
AODV
F3TM
with
AODV
300 0.7661 13 9 15
400 0.8611 14 11 16
600 1.0952 12 7 18
800 1.1111 12 14 20
1000 1.2055 12 20 23
1100 1.2600 13 22 25
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Figure 9 Comparison graph of the throughput of F3TM with
AODV, and CORMAN and PRIME with AODV.
Flooding Factor based Trust Management Framework 279based Trust Management Framework (F3TM) for the mobile
ad hoc network is secure in MANET. Each and every process
makes the F3TM efﬁcient for data transmission.
9. Conclusion
In this paper, a Flooding Factor based Framework for Trust
Management (F3TM) has been presented using calculated
trust value as the identiﬁcation for malicious nodes. From
the design, development and evaluation of the proposed frame-
work, following conclusions have been made. F3TM is usefulfor secure data dissemination in scalable MANET environ-
ment. Experimental Grey Wolf algorithm based node valida-
tion and Multi-Swarm Optimization based route selection is
beneﬁcial for optimal and efﬁcient data dissemination. Aver-
age packet delivery delay of F3TM is lower as compared to
that of PRIME and CORMAN. F3TM generates lesser con-
trol overheads in comparison with the state-of-the-art tech-
niques. Packet delivery ratio and throughput of F3TM are
signiﬁcantly higher than those of the state-of-the-art
techniques.References
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